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Test of a Taking: An Analysis of the
1984 Cable Act's "Mandatory Access"
Provision
INTRODUCION
Cable television has come to have a phenomenal impact on
Americans today. From pay-per-view sports events to the M V
generation, the industry has defined home entertainment and will
continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Of the approximately
147 million people who have access to cable television,' there are
actually 56 million subscribers and cable operators serviced by
11,314 cable systems in some 30,579 communities throughout the
United States.
2
So pervasive an industry rarely escapes regulation, and the
cable industry is no exception. A federal cable regulatory policy
was adopted in the form of the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 (the "Act"). Prior to its enactment, the involvement of
different levels of government in the regulation of cable created
considerable problems.4 Not only did the Federal Communications
Commission (the "FCC") have an interest in protecting broadcast
television,5 state and local governments had an interest in oversee-
1. Brief for Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. at 5, Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v.
McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600 (1 ith Cir.) (No. 91-8032) (citing BRoAD-
CAS'TING & CABLE MARKETPLACE: THE INDUSTRY SOURCE FOR RADIO, TELEVISION AND
CABLE xxiii (1992)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992).
2. Id.
3. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & West Supp. 1992). The most recent amendment
to Title 47 of the U.S. Code, Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992), does not address the land use issues
relevant to this Note. See S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1156.
4. Michael I. Meyerson, Cable Television's New Legal Universe: Early Judicial
Response to the Cable Act, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 1 (1987).
5. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1988 & West Supp. 1992). The FCC has stated
that cable uses broadcast signals as the backbone of the service they provide. Amend-
ment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to
Community Antenna Television Systems, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 222 (1969) (First Report and
Order).
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ing cable operators' use of public streets and rights of way.6
Passed on October 29, 1984, the Act was the first comprehensive
cable legislation of its kind.7 For the first time, federal legislation
defined the scope of regulatory power at all levels of government.8
The Act begins with a list of six purposes9 that reflect a reason-
able compromise between the public's right to a free flow of infor-
mation, local government's interest in franchising and regulating
cable operators, and cable industry's desire for growth.' °
While the Act as a whole has been largely successful, one issue
6. Michael I. Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balanc-
ing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REV. 543, 544 (1985). See also Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th Cir. 1981) ("A city
needs control over the number of times its citizens must bear the inconvenience of having
its streets dug up and the best times for it to occur."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
7. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 &
West Supp. 1992). Prior to the passage of the Act, the FCC regulated cable pursuant to
its ancillary power over broadcasting under the Communications Act of 1934. See S.
REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1134.
8. H.R. RPE. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4656.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1988 & West Supp. 1992). The purposes of the Act were to:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth
and development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are
responsive to the needs and interests of the local community;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority
with respect to the regulation of cable systems;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide
the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the
public;
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable
operators against unfair denials of renewal where the operator's past per-
formance and proposal for future performance meet the standards estab-
lished by this subchapter, and
(6) promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary
regulation that would impose an undue economic burden on cable systems.
Id.
10. 130 CONG. REc. S14,284 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Gorton)
("[The Act] reflects a reasonable compromise which protects the interests of not only the
cities and the cable industry, but those of the consumers of cable services as well."); see
also id. at S 14,283 (statement of Sen. Goldwater) ("Nonetheless, this bill is a compromise,
and on the whole, it is a good bill, and a needed bill. It is proconsumer, procity, and
procable.").
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that it sought to address-but failed to remedy-was the debate
over the right of franchised cable operators to obtain mandatory
access to private, residential co-easements." Although the issue
was addressed in § 621(a)(2) of the Act,12 courts have interpreted
its statutory language and legislative history in varying ways that
have resulted in inter-circuit, as well as intra-circuit, conflicts.
13
The question that has yet to be definitively answered is whether
§ 621(a)(2) of the Act allows cable operators to use co-easements
dedicated for compatible uses without effectuating a taking of prop-
erty under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution. Of course, if § 621(a)(2) does effectuate a
11. Compare Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902
F.2d 905, 911 (1lth Cir. 1990) (holding that cable company had right of access to private
utility easements in development) with Media Gen. Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium
Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 913 (S.D. Va. 1990) (holding that the Act did
not create right of mandatory access to private utility easements).
12. Section 621(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (1988) states:
Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the construction of a cable system
over public rights-of-way, and through easements, which is within the area to
be served by the cable system and which have been dedicated for compatible
uses, except that in using such easements the cable operator shall ensure-
(A) that the safety, functioning, and appearance of the property and the
convenience and safety of other persons not be adversely affected by
the installation or construction of facilities necessary for a cable sys-
tem;
(B) that the cost of the installation, construction, operation, or removal of
such facilities be borne by the cable operator or subscriber, or a com-
bination of both; and
(C) that the owner of the property be justly compensated by the cable
operator for any damages caused by the installation, construction,
operation, or removal of such facilities by the cable operator.
13. Compare Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953
F.2d 600 (11th Cir.) (holding that the government cannot authorize co-use of easements
"even when a property owner has privately allowed other occupations which are 'compati-
ble") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 182 (1992) and Cable Invs., Inc. v.
Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that § 621(a)(2) does not mandate
access to cable operators) with Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev.
Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 911 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that easements need not be publicly
dedicated and that compatible easements include private easements) and Centel Cable
Television Co. of Fla. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs., Ltd., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 n.7 (11th
Cir. 1988) (holding that § 621(a)(2) allowed a cable company to use the easement without
violating the Takings Clause).
528 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
taking, the Fifth Amendment requires that the property owner be
given just compensation for his or her lost value.
An example may help to elucidate the issues involved here.
Suppose a landlord decides that instead of getting cable service
from the local cable franchise operator for the tenants in his :com-
plex, he would like to use a satellite television operator.14  The
cable operator, who has a franchise in the neighborhood in ques-:
tion, will claim that his installation of cable by means of an exist-
ing utility easement is a compatible use under § 621(a)(2), which
gives him the right of mandatory access to the landowner's proper-
ty. Thus, he will argue that the landowner cannot refuse him ac-
cess. The landlord, on the other hand, will assert that his funda-
mental rights as a property owner include the right to exclude.'5
This right would be infringed upon by § 621(a)(2), and the landlord
would argue that the statute-to the extent that it requires mandato-
ry access-would be an unconstitutional taking without just com-
pensation.
Both arguments have substantial support depending on one's
interpretation of the statute's wording and its legislative history.
Both sides would agree, however, that mandatory access to public
easements where utility lines are already laid raises no controver-
sy.' 6 The statute provides for access to some easements, but the
statute is unclear as to which easements allow for a right of access
and which do not.
14. Satellite Master Antennae Television (SMATV) are cable television systems that
do not use public rights-of-way. They primarily serve private, multi-unit residential
buildings and offer the residents both over-the-air broadcast signals and satellite delivered
services. See In re Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1223 (1983), aff'd
sub nom. New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
15. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 n.12 (1982)
(the Court considered the owner's right to exclude a decisive factor in determining wheth-
er it would characterize a physical taking as permanent or temporary; if the owner's right
to exclude is absolutely lost, then the physical invasion is permanent in nature). The
landowner would argue that this is the situation here.
16. See White, 902 F.2d at 909 (citing Admiral's Cove, 835 F.2d at 1362); Cable
Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871, 873 (N.D.
Ga. 1986), rev'd, 953 F.2d 600, 607 (1Ith. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992).
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Although cases addressing this dilemma have come down on
both sides of the debate, only two circuits have attempted to inter-
pret the Act. In Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, held that the Act did
not give cable system operators a right of access to multi-unit
dwellings for purposes of providing services for tenants. 7
Until recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit had concluded that § 621(a)(2) embraced private ease-
ments, giving rights to cable franchises over property owners. This
was illustrated in both Centel Cable Television Co. of Florida v.
Admiral's Cove Associates, Ltd.,"8 and Centel Cable Television Co.
of Florida v. Thos. J. White Development Corp.'9 These cases held
that cable franchisees have an implied right of action under the Act
to enforce their right of access to utility easements in private, sin-
gle residential communities during the construction phase of the
communities' development.
What has created some controversy is that the Eleventh Circuit
recently decided a case in favor of a property owner. In Cable
Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd.,20
the court held that § 621(a)(2) granted franchised cable companies
a right of access to easements that have been dedicated for "com-
patible uses" but that the section did not authorize access to pri-
vate, non-dedicated easements for particular utilities in multi-unit
apartment buildings."' Furthermore, the court held that construing
the Act as according a cable franchise operator the right to con-
struct a cable system on private property regardless of the presence
of any compatible easements would violate the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.22 In essence, the court restricted § 621(a)(2)
to situations in which the easement was dedicated to public use.
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Cable Holdings from its two
17. 867 F.2d at 151.
18. 835 F.2d 1359 (1lth Cir. 1988).
19. 902 F.2d 905 (1lth Cir. 1990).
20. 953 F.2d at 600.
21. Id. at 605.
22. Id. at 604.
23. Id. at 607.
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earlier opposing decisions?' In reality, however, the conclusion
reached in Cable Holdings-that the Act did not give a right of
access to private easements-was in conflict with its earlier deci-
sions.25 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit's two opposing views
only add to the present confusion.
What is common to all of these opinions, however, is that in
one way or another, they resort to a takings analysis to justify their
position.26 Part One of this Note provides an overview of easement
law as general background on the property issues at stake. Part
Two discusses the Takings Clause and explains the two major cate-
gories of takings---"per se" and regulatory. Part Three examines
the interpretations of takings law employed by the Third and Elev-
enth Circuits in analyzing the Act. Part Four argues that a bright-
line physical invasion test, similar to the de minimis physical inva-
sion test developed in Loretto v.- Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp. ,27 is the appropriate standard for determining whether a tak-
ing has occurred.
This Note concludes that giving cable companies mandatory
access to private easements would constitute a taking under the
Fifth Amendment. Since Congress did not authorize compensation
in the statute, it could not have intended for § 621(a)(2) to allow
cable companies to utilize private easements without property own-
ers' permission.28 Furthermore, the legislative history of the Act
clearly supports the view that Congress did not intend cable com-
panies' right of access to include private easements.
24. Id. at 608 (the court differentiated, for example, "dedicated" from "non-dedicat-
ed" easements and "private" from "public" easements).
25. See Admiral's Cove, 835 F.2d 1359; White, 902 F.2d 905.
26. See Cable Holdings, 953 F.2d at 601; White, 902 F.2d at 910; Woolley, 867 F.2d
at 158; Admiral's Cove, 835 F.2d at 1363; Media Gen. Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condo-
minium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 913 (E.D. Va. 1990); Greater Worces-
ter Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985).
27. 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) ("a permanent physical occupation authorized by
government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve").
28. But see Greater Worcester Cablevison, 682 F. Supp. at 1259 (arguing that §
621(a)(2) does provide for just compensation).
[Vol. 3:525
1993] TAKINGS BY "MANDATORY ACCESS" FOR CABLE 531
I. EASEMENTS
An easement is a grant of an interest in land that entitles a
person to use land possessed by another.2 9 It can be created by
express agreement, by estoppel, by implication, by necessity, or by
prescription. 0
Easements can be classified as affirmative or negative.3' This
classification differentiates easements on the basis of the kind of
action permitted to the easement owner with respect to the servient
estate. An affirmative easement gives its owner the right to go
onto the land of another and do some act on that land.3 2 Negative
easements, on the other hand, are those that prohibit the owner of
the servient estate from doing something otherwise lawful upon his
estate because it would affect the dominant estate (i.e. the ease-
ment);33 it consists solely of a veto power? 4  Examples of this
would be light and air easements that would prevent the owner of
one building from denying these necessities to the owner of a near-
by or adjoining building. Negative easements are rare and are not
discussed in the Act. The Act does, however, address affirmative
easements.
In addition to being characterized as affirmative or negative,
easements are either appurtenant or in gross.35  An appurtenant
29. See BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 509 (6th ed. 1990). See also 3 RICHARD R.
POwELL, PO\VELL ON REAL PROPERTY 404[1], at 34-3 (Patrick L Rohan rev. ed., 1992).
30. See generally A.N. Yiannopoulos, Servitudes Creation by Title: Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 45 TUL. L. REV. 459 (1971)." See also Coumas v. Transcontinental
Garage, Inc., 230 P.2d 748 (Vyo. 1951).
The general rule is stated in 28 C.S., Easements § 5, p. 639 [sic] to the effect
that 'an easement may be created or passed only by deed, that is, by grant,
reservation, or covenant, or by prescription which presupposes a grant.' ...
That appears to be true on account of the policy of the law particularly because
of the statute of frauds, not to permit the creation of an interest in the land of
another except by the methods as mentioned.
3 POWELL, supra note 29, 406 (quoting Coumas, 230 P.2d at 754); 2 AMEimuCAN LAW
OF PROPERTY, (Casner et al. eds., 1952 & Supp. 1962)) (same).
31. 3 POWELL, supra note 29, 405, at 34-19.
32. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 509 (6th ed. 1990).
33. Id. at 510.
34. 3 POWELL, supra note 29, 405, at 34-20.
35. REsTATEmENT OF PROPERTY §§ 453-54 (1944).
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easement benefits its owner in the use of another (frequently adja-
cent) tract of land. The land benefitted is the dominant tenement
while the land burdened is the servient tenement. A easement in
gross, on the other hand, does not benefit its owner in the use and
enjoyment of land but merely gives him the right to the use of the
servient land. An easement in gross benefits its owner indepen-
dently of his ownership or possession of other land.37 Thus, it
benefits an entity other than the owner.38 Since easements in gross
tend to involve property interests that are commercial in nature,
39
most utility easements fall into this category.
As briefly illustrated, easements can fall into a variety of cate-
gories, but as a general rule, the scope of the easement depends
upon the intention of the parties.40 In ascertaining this intent, a
court may examine whether the easement was created expressly or
by prescription (adversely), the changes in use that might be fore-
seeable by the parties, and the changes in use that are required to
achieve the purpose of the easement under modem conditions while
preserving the usefulness of the easement to the dominant tene-
ment.
41
While it is common for easements in gross to exist on private
property as private easements,42 the question of whether particular
36. 3 POVELL, supra note 29, 405, at 34-20, 34-21 (citing Shingleton v. State, 133
S.E.2d 183 (N.C. 1963) (noting that an easement appurtenant is one that is owned in
connection with other land and is an incident to ownership of such land and holding that
a grant by the state wildlife resources commission to use roads existing on other lands of
the commission for ingress to and egress from land conveyed to grantee was a grant of
an easement appurtenant to such conveyed land)).
37. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 454 cmt. a (1944). See also Shingleton, 133
S.E.2d at 185 (stating that an easement in gross is a mere personal interest in or a right
to use the land of another); W.R. Vance, Assignability of Easements in Gross, 32 YALE
L.J. 813 (1923).
38. 3 PO\VELL, supra note 29, % 405, at 34-20.
39. See Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Utah 1984) (applying the definition
that "[a]n easement in gross is of a commercial character when the use authorized by it
results primarily in economic benefit rather than personal satisfaction," to find that an
easement involving a herd of cattle being driven to their summer range was transferrable)
(quoting Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdale, 143 S.E.2d 803, 807 (S.C. 1965)).
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 509-10 (6th ed. 1990).
41. Id.
42. See Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television, 212 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34-36 (Ct. App.
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easements are public or private43 is critical in interpreting the Act.
In making these determinations, it is necessary to ascertain the
landowner's intent in creating an easement and the meaning of the
word "dedicated" in the statute." For example, landowners typical-
ly argue that easements must be private unless intentionally dedi-
cated to public use. As might be expected, this dedication question
has become the fulcrum of courts' analysis of whether the applica-
tion of § 621(a)(2) constitutes a taking. Consideration of the vary-
ing judicial analyses of the takings question requires a brief over-
view of takings law.
I. TAKNGS ANALYSis
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution states, in part, "nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." 45 Federal, state, and local govern-
ments thus have the power of eminent domain-the power to take
title to property against the owner's will. They simply must pay
the owner just compensation for his or her property.
In examining takings law, it helps to reflect on its two basic
premises:
1. All takings must be for public use, and
2. Even takings that are for public use must be accompanied
by just compensation.46
1985).
43. "A private easement is one in which the enjoyment is restricted to one or a few
individuals, while a public easement is one the right to the enjoyment of which is vested
in the public generally or in an entire community; such as an easement of passage on
public streets and highways... ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 510 (6th ed. 1990).
44. See Section 621(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) ('easements... dedicated for com-
patible uses"). See also infra notes 110-116 and accompanying text (case law discussion
of "dedicated" as related to the Act).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
46. See U.S. CONST. amend V. For an excellent historical analysis of the just com-
pensation clause, see William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance
of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,.94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985); see
also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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It is part of current takings jurisprudence that a wide range of
uses can serve the public even if the public does not take actual
possession of "taken" land.47 If property is taken for public bene-
fit, however, eminent domain laws require just compensation.48
The policy value underlying the compensation requirement is the
sense that if government is seeking to produce some public benefit
(the public use requirement), it is appropriate that the payment
come from the public at large-taxpayers-rather than from identi-
fiable individuals. 49 The Constitution's compensation requirement
thus operates as insurance to that effect.
One of the fundamental rights that a property owner has is the
right to exclude."0 An eminent domain action forces the landowner
to give up that right either partially or completely. To minimize
the injustice of such a situation, the law has required that the owner
be compensated at fair market value. Courts have refined their
takings analysis by categorizing takings as one of two types: regu-
latory or per se.
A regulatory taking is the more complex of the two types be-
cause there is no set formula for determining when there has been
a taking. The classic case setting forth the difference between an
invalid taking and a valid exercise of police power is Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.51 At issue in Mahon was the constitutionality
of the Kohler Act,52 a 1921 Pennsylvania statute that sought to
combat the persistent problem of soil subsidence in Pennsylvania's
anthracite mining region.53 The statute prohibited the mining of
anthracite coal deposits located beneath someone else's property in
47. See Michelman, supra note 46, at 1170 (discussing the Mill Acts, which permit-
ted riparian owners the right to erect and maintain dams that flooded neighboring proper-
ty).
48. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NON-TRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 18
(1977).
49. Michelman, supra note 46, at 1170.
50. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
51. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
52. 1921 Pa. Laws 1198.
53. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 563 (1984). For earlier legislation addressing the
surface support problem, see 1913 Pa. Laws 1439.
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such a manner as to cause the sinking of various structures on the
surface (including streets, railroad lines, churches, hospitals, and
most importantly in Mahon, dwellings). Before the statute was
enacted, the Pennsylvania Coal Company had sold the surface
rights to land that it owned to Mahon, reserving the right to remove
the coal thereunder. Because- the statute made it commercially
impracticable to mine the coal, and thus had nearly the same effect
as the complete destruction of the mineral rights, the Court held the
statute invalid as a taking without just compensation. 54 Writing for
the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: "The general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 5 In
creating this test, now known as the "diminution-in-value" test, Jus-
tice Holmes recognized that the exercise of police power could
diminish "to some extent values incident to property" without im-
plicating the Takings Clause because otherwise "[glovemment
hardly could go on. 5 6 Holmes also noted that the compensation
provision of the Takings Clause imposed certain limitations on the
exercise of police power.57 It is the extent of the diminution that
is the factor for consideration. "When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of emi-
nent domain and compensation to sustain the act."58
The second, and more readily comprehensible, type of takings
analysis focuses on the actual physical invasion that occurs when
the government takes property. It is this kind of analysis that
courts have used to determine whether a taking has occurred in the
context of the Act.59
54. 260 U.S. at 414-15.
55. Id. at 415.
56. Id. at 413.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1244 (D. Mass. 1985) (discussing diminution-in-value test court suggested that taking
should be determined by whether or not use of a given easement or right-of-way amount-
ed to an additional servitude on the underlying property).
For an analysis of the diminution in value test in relation to the Act, see Matthew
P. Pritts, Note, The Material Burden Test: The Better Method of Determining Takings
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Most of the opinions discussing § 621(a)(2) of the Acte have
relied on Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.61 In
Loretto, the United States Supreme Court considered the consti-
tutionality of a New York statute that required landlords to permit
the installation of cable television facilities on their property.62 The
New York statute63 also prohibited landlords from demanding pay-
ment from cable television companies in excess of the amount that
the State Commission on Cable Television determined reasonable.64
The plaintiff in Loretto, a purchaser of an apartment building that
had cable wires and boxes already attached to its roof and side,
sued for damages and injunctive relief, claiming that the New York
statute authorized a taking without just compensation.6 The
Loretto Court noted that the ordinary inquiry into the takings issue
was based on the following criteria: the economic impact of the
regulation, the extent of interference with investment-backed expec-
tations, and the character of the governmental a~tion 6 It observed,
however, that if a law authorized a permanent physical occupation
of an owner's property, the character of the governmental action
pursuant to the law rendered it a taking per se.67
The Loretto Court upheld New York's access statute but re-
quired payment of just compensation for the permanent physical
Issues Arising Under Section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1109 (1992). The diminution in value test will continue to
pose problems because it is an ambiguous test. The question of how much diminution
in value is too much cannot be answered with objectivity.
60. See Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d
600, 604 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992); Centel Cable Television Co. of
Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 909 (1lth Cir. 1990); Cable Invs., Inc.
v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1989); Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v.
Admiral's Cove Assocs., Ltd., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1988); Media Gen. Cable,
Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 910 (E.D. Va.
1990); Cable Assocs., Inc. v. Town & Country Management Corp., 709 F. Supp. 582, 588
(E.D. Pa. 1989); Greater Worcester Cablevision, 682 F. Supp. at 1259.
61. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
62. Id. at 421.
63. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 828(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1993).
64. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423.
65. ld. at 424.
66. Id. at 426.
67. id
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occupation of the landlord's property.6" The rationale behind the
decision was that New York's statutorily approved, permanent
physical occupation of property destroyed not only the owner's
right to possess the space and exclude others from it, but also the
owner's right to control the space and his right to dispose of it by
transfer or sale.69
Writing for the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that a
property owner suffered a special kind of injury when a stranger
directly invaded and occupied the owner's property.70 Regulations
that authorized this type of physical occupation would be viewed
by the Court as serious intrusions, regardless of whether the physi-
cal interference caused a substantial economic loss or served an
important public purpose.71 Thus, under the terms of Loretto, any
physical invasion, no matter how small, will be considered a tak-
ing! 2 The Court has recently affirmed this de minimis permanent
physical invasion test.73
Ifl. SURVEY OF CASE LAW
In interpreting the legislative history and statutory language of
§ 621(a)(2) prior to February 1992, courts followed either the Third
Circuit's "physical invasion ' 74 or the Eleventh Circuit's mandatory
68. Id. at 441.
69. Id. at 435.
70. Id. at 436.
71. Id.
72. There are some who consider the Loretto holding a narrow one and argue that
it should not be applied. See, e.g., Richard Harmon, Co-Use of Compatible Private
Easements by Cable Television Franchisees Under the 1984 Cable Act: Federal Refine-
ment of an Established Right, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1 (1992). However, dicta in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992), support the
interpretation of Loretto used in this Note.
73. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. In Lucas, Justice Scalia stated, "In general (at
least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no
matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation." Id.
74. See Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that §
621(a)(2) does not give access to private easements); Media Gen. Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah
Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Va. 1990) (same); Cable
Assocs., Inc. v. Town & Country Management Corp., 709 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(same).
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access75 approach. Both circuits applied a per se approach to tak-
ings law.
The Third Circuit has followed the permanent physical invasion
test of Loretto and considers it controlling on this issue.76 In the
leading case of Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 7 the court
found that § 621(a)(2) of the Act did not give franchises the right
of access to the inside of private apartment buildings.7 8 In arriving
at their decision,, the court relied on the legislative history of the
Act and in particular, § 633,79 a section that was ultimately dropped
75. Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. . White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905,
911 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that § 621(a)(2) does not give access to private easements);
Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs., Ltd., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363
(11th Cir. 1988) (same); Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Burg & DiVosta Corp.,
712 F. Supp. 176, 178 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same); Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v.
Carabetta Enters., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985) (same).
76. See Woolley, 867 F.2d at 155 (holding that § 621(a)(2) of the Act does not give
franchises the right of access to the inside of private apartment buildings).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Consumer Access to Cable Service, H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (deleted
section of the Act) [hereinafter "Deleted Section 633"]. This section provided:
(a) The owner of any multiple-unit residential or commercial building or manu-
factured home park may not prevent or interfere with the construction or instal-
lation of facilities necessary for a cable system, consistent with this section, if
cable service or other communications service has been requested by a lessee
or owner (including a person who owns shares which entitle such person to
occupy a unit in a cooperative project) of a unit in such building or park.
(b)(1) A State or franchising authority may, and the Commission shall, prescribe
regulations which provide-
(A) that the safety, functioning, and appearance of the premises and
the convenience and safety of other persons not be adversely affected
by the installation or construction of facilities necessary f6r a cable
system;
(B) that the cost of the installation, construction, operation, or remov-
al of such facilities be borne by the cable operator or subscriber, or
a combination of both;
(C) that the owner be justly compensated by the cable operator for
any damages caused by the installation, construction, operation, or
removal of such facilities by the cable operator; and
(D) methods of determining just compensation under this section.
(d) In prescribing methods under subsection (b)(1)(D) for determining just
compensation, consideration shall be given to-
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from the bill that was passed by Congress.80 Section 633 expressly
provided for mandatory access to tenants within a multi-unit dwell-
ing.8" The Woolley court reasoned that the fact that Congress delet-
ed this section from the final version of the Act indicated that
"Congress did not intend that cable companies could compel the
owner of a multi-unit dwelling to permit them to use the owner's
private property to provide cable service to apartment dwellers."'82
In addition, the Woolley court examined statements in the Congres-
sional Record-both opposed to and those in favor of § 633. The
court found that these statements further strengthened its conclusion
that the Act contains no provision mandating access to private
apartments buildings.8 3
(1) the extent to which the cable system facilities physically occupy
the premises;
(2) the actual long-term damage which the cable system facilities may
cause to the premises;
(3) the extent to which the cable system facilities would interfere with
the normal use and enjoyment of the premises; and
(4) the enhancement in value of the premises resulting from the avail-
ability of services provided over the cable system.
Id. (emphasis added).
80. Woolley, 867 F.2d at 156.
81. Deleted Section 633, supra note 80.
82. Woolley, 867 F.2d at 156 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24
(1983) ("Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but
deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended."));
Thompson v. Kennickell, 797 F.2d 1015, 1024-25 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding deletion of
provision contributes to evidence of congressional intent).
83. Woolley, 867 F.2d at 156.
The absence of a mandatory access provision in the bill as finally enacted was
specifically remarked upon by Congressman Wirth, the Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Telecommunications of the House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee from which the bill emanated. Representative Wirth was one of the
original sponsors of the bill and had been in favor of the multi-unit dwelling
provision. After its deletion, he stated:
"The purpose of [section 633] was to ensure that all consumers in-
cluding those who reside in apartments and mobile home parks, had
the opportunity to receive cable service .... The provision prohibit-
ed landlords from interfering with a consumer's ability to receive
cable service-an increasing [sic] troublesome problem whereby land-
lords become the ultimate electronic editors. . . . I applaud these
efforts" [of states who have enacted laws to provide for citizen ac-
cess] "and, of course, the fact that a similar provision is no longer
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Finally, the court noted that when § 633 was deleted from the
final version of the Act, many of its provisions were transferred to
§ 621.84 Interestingly enough, those provisions which dealt with
just compensation for a taking were not transferred.85 The court
reasoned that the Act did not provide for mandatory access because
otherwise the physical invasion would be a taking without just
compensation and therefore unconstitutional under Loretto. 6
Contrary to Woolley, several courts have held that § 621(a)(2)
of the Act grants cable companies a federal right to use both public
and private easements.8 7 Most notably, until Cable Holdings of
Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd.,88 the Eleventh
Circuit held this view. Unlike the Third Circuit, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, while also applying a per se takings approach, avoided the
takings problem 9 by relying on a case which employed a voluntary
part of [the bill] in no way affects the applicability of those State
laws.
In addition, Representative Fields, also a member of the House Energy and
Commerce Committee who had opposed the mandatory access provision com-
mented:
The bill before us today does not contain a provision [which] I had
particular concern about in committee, the so-called consumer access
to cable.
Although I concur with the intent of this provision, to make cable
service available to the greatest number of individuals, I believe this
goal can be achieved in a better, more orderly manner through a
negotiated agreement between the cable operator and the property
owner, and not by legislative fiat as this legislation had provided.
Id. at 156-57.
84. Id. at 156-58.
85. Id. at 157.
86. Id. at 159-60.
87. See Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d
905, 908-09 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 8, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655 (stating that § 621(a)(2) gives cable companies access to "compatible"
easements including easements or rights-of-way dedicated for electric, gas, or other utility
transmission)); see also Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs.,
Ltd., 835 F.2d 1359, 1362 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1988); Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil
Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871, 873 (N.D. Ga. 1986), rev'd, 953 F.2d 600
(1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992)
88. 953 F.2d 600 (11th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 609 & 609 n.lI (Eleventh Circuit's non-taking rationale). Basically, the
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takings analysis, FCC v. Florida Power Corp.90
In Florida Power, the United States Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of the Pole Attachments Act9' which gives the
FCC power to regulate the rates that a utility charges cable compa-
nies for the use of the utility companies' poles.92 The Court held
that regulation of the rates utilities charge cable television compa-
nies to place their cables on the utilities poles does not amount to
a taking.93
What distinguishes Florida Power from Loretto is that the utili-
ty companies in Florida Power voluntarily granted the easements
to the cable companies.94 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit's argu-
ment prior to the Cable Holdings decision was that the "compatible
easements" described in § 621(a)(2) of the Act were also voluntary
because they had been dedicated. For example, in Centel Cable
Television Co. of Florida v. Admiral's Cove Associates, Ltd.,95 a
cable operator successfully challenged a developer who sought to
prevent the company from laying cable at the same time as tele-
phone and electric utilities lines. The court reasoned that because
'the owner voluntarily had granted the easement to the utility com-
panies, Congress had the authority to allow a cable company to use
the easement without violating the Takings Clause.
96
court reasoned that if an easement has been voluntarily granted to one entity and another
entity seeks to make a similar use (without unduly burdening the easement or the underly-
ing property owner's use) it may use that easement without effectuating a taking of
property.
90. 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
91. Pole Attachments Act, Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6,92 Stat. 35 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1988)).
92. 480 U.S. at 247-48.
93. Id. at 254.
94. Id. at 252-53.
95. 835 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1988).
96. Id. at 1363 n.7.
Since most developers voluntarily grant easements for use by utilities, however,
Congress may force the developer to allow a cable franchise to use the ease-
ment without offending the taking cause [sic] of the Constitution. See FCC v.
Florida Power Corp., [480 U.S. 245 (1987)]. Such "voluntary" action by
developers may be an integral part of zoning procedures or the obtaining of
necessary building permits. However obtained, once an easement is established
for utilities it is well within the authority of Congress to include cable television
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The Eleventh Circuit followed Admiral's Cove in Centel Cable
Television Co. of Florida v. Thos. J. White Development Corp.97
In White, the defendants excluded a cable operator from using
private roads within a private development that were necessary to
maintain its cable system, which was constructed along utility ease-
ments. In order to justify this exclusion, the defendants argued that
the Act authorized use of public easements, but not utility ease-
ments, and that the Act would be unconstitutional if applied to non-
public easements. The district court, relying on Admiral's Cove
and the trial court holding in Cable Holdings,9 rejected these con-
tentions stating that "the legislature did not place any special sig-
nificance on the meaning of the term 'dedicate' over and above its
common meaning 'to set."' 99
In general, Admiral's Cove and White stand for the proposition
that once an easement is voluntarily granted to one entity, another
entity that desires to make a similar use (which will not unduly
burden the easement or interfere with either the underlying property
owner's use of his land or the easement holders use of the ease-
ment), may use that easement without effectuating a taking of the
property."°
The holdings of Admiral's Cove and White have been restricted,
however, by the Eleventh Circuit's latest decision, Cable Holdings
of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd.'0' which lim-
its access to publicly dedicated easements. This decision has caused
an intra-circuit conflict.102
In Cable Holdings a landlord had given a cable system operator
permission to provide cable service in a private apartment complex.
In doing this, the landlord excluded its competitor, the local fran-
as a user.
Id.
97. 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1990).
98. 678 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
99. Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., No. 88-14148,
slip op. at 16-17 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 905 (1lth Cir. 1990).
100. See Harmon, supra note 72, at 7-11.
101. 953 F.2d 600 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992).
102. See Harmon, supra note 72, at 7-11.
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chised cable firm. The district court, in applying § 621(a)(2),
found that the landlord could not exclude the local cable company
from his buildings in this manner. The court held "clearly and
unambiguously" that the language of § 621(a)(2) contains no re-
quirement that the easement be dedicated for public use. 03 Fur-
thermore, the court held that a cable operator could "piggyback" on
telephone, electrical or even a SMATV operator's own lines to gain
access to private apartment buildings." .
In February 1992, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court
decision. It held that the Act "only allows a franchised cable com-
pany to access easements on private property when the property
owner has dedicated those easements for general utility use '10 5 In
so holding, the court relied-as did the Woolley court--on the
legislative history of the Acte' 6 and on the Loretto decision. 0 7 The
court recognized the importance of a property owner's right to
exclude.'08 It found that this right needs to be "tenaciously guarded
by the courts."'10 9
The court had a difficult task in attempting to reconcile its
decision with Admiral's Cove and White. It distinguished these
cases by the fadt that the easement in Cable Holdings was "non-
dedicated"" 0 as opposed to the dedicated easements found in Admi-
ral's Cove and White. A dedicated easement is typically granted
before a private property owner develops a new residential subdivi-
103. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp.
871, 873 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
104. Id. at 875.
105. Cable Holdings, 953 F.2d. at 605.
106. Id. at 606 ("Because the language of the statute is less than clear, we turn to
the legislative history of the Cable Act.").
107. Id. at 604-05 ("When the government appropriates an owner's right to exclude
another's physical presence without paying the owner just compensation, the government
violates the Takings Clause.").
108. Id. at 604 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S.
419, 433 (1982)).
109. Id. at 605.
110. In Cable Holdings "non-dedicated" means that the plats dedicated for utility
easements are not recorded with the appropriate authority. Id. at 608. The landlord,
through private negotiation and agreement, allowed particular utilities to cross its land and
enter its buildings to provide service for tenants. Id. at 609.
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sion by recording plats."' In Cable Holdings, the court reasoned
that because the easements were not dedicated, forcing cable access
would have been an involuntary permanent physical invasion that
required just compensation' 1 2 This consideration, in the court's
opinion, was not provided for in the statute.f 3
Although the Cable Holdings court saw its holding as distinct
from Admiral's Cove and White on the "dedicated" versus "non-
dedicated" easements issue, the harmonization ran afoul on other
problems. For example, in White, the landowner classified certain
"rights-of-way as private" and then argued that congressional au-
thorization for co-use of "'private easements' is a per se violation
of the Takings Clause.""14 The court rejected this argument, as
have other courts in the Eleventh Circuit. 15 This is in direct oppo-
sition to the Cable Holdings decision in which the court intimated
that access to compatible, private easements would constitute a per
se taking of private property by usurping the property owner's right
to exclude."16
In Cable Holdings, the court encountered some of the many di-
lemmas that have plagued courts attempting to interpret § 621(a)(2)
of the Act. A review of the cases reveals inter- and intra-circuit
conflicts and demonstrates the need to develop a single standard to
be followed in interpreting § 621(a)(2).
IV. A BRIGHT-LINE TEST: FOLLOWING LORETTO
If § 621(a)(2) did authorize cable companies to construct their
cable systems on private properties, regardless of the presence of
compatible easements, it would be a taking under Loretto v.
111. Id. at 608. In Admiral's Cove and White, the Florida utility law required the
developer to dedicate the corridors for utility use. In both cases the developers recorded
the plates with the appropriate governmental authority showing the corridors of land
available for utility use. Id. at 609.
112. Id. at 605 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. 419).
113. Id. at 602.
114. Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905,
909 (1lth Cir. 1990).
115. Id. at 910 (citations omitted).
116. Cable Holdings, 953 F.2d at 604.
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Teleprompter Manhattan CATY Corp."7 Placement of cable in or
along an easement is plainly a physical occupation of easement
space. While this burden may not be great and the economic im-
pact and interference with investment-backed expectations may be
small," 8 the invasion here is physical and constitutes a taking.
Furthermore, constitutional protection for the rights of private prop-
erty cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently
occupied. 119 The laying of the cable cords is a permanent physical
occupation' and constitutes a taking under Loretto.121 The avoid-
ance of the takings analysis in the Eleventh Circuit opinions prior
to Cable Holdings is misguided because Loretto's physical invasion
test is essential to any analysis of this issue. Although Admiral's
Cove and White disagree with this proposition, these courts incor-
rectly rely on the "voluntary" rationale of FCC v. Florida Power
Corp.22 This erroneous supposition is relegated to one footnote in
Admiral's Cove where the takings issue is presented and dismissed
in two sentences." 3 This same footnote is the basis for dismissing
117. 458 U.S. 419.
118. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 401 (1922).
119. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37.
120. See Media Gen. Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-owners,
737 F. Supp. 903, 907 (E.D. Va. 1990).
121. See id. at 907 n.8.
In considering the difference between a permanent and a temporary occupation,
Justice Marshall, for the Loretto majority, discussed several earlier cases.
Referring to PruneYard Shopping Center v.. Robins, 447 U.S. 74... (1980), he
noted that no taking occurs where individuals solicit petition signatures on
shopping center property in part because such occupation would be "temporary
and limited in nature." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 .... And discussing Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164... (1979), Justice Marshall noted that an
"easement of passage, not being a permanent occupation of land, was not con-
sidered a taking per se!' 458 U.S. at 433.... Here, by contrast, Media Gener-
al's use of the [existing easement] would be a constant physical occupation of
land.... Such an occupation is different from the temporary occupations cited
in Loretto; those temporary occupations were fleeting, lasting only moments in
the case of easements for passage and hours in the case of the PruneYard solici-
tors.
Id.
122. 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
123. Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs., Ltd., 835 F.2d
1359, 1363 n.7 (IIth Cir. 1988).
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the takings analysis in White as well. 24 Thus, although the Elev-
enth Circuit agrees with Loretto, it finds no need to analyze the
decision in relation to the Act on the theory that the Act should be
looked at from a "voluntary" perspective.
The Florida Power court distinguished Loretto on the grounds
that the New York statute in that case ifivolved forced governmen-
tal access to a landlord's property, while the Pole Attachments Act
in Florida Power merely regulated commercial leases already "vol-
untarily" established between cable companies and the property
owner.25 Unlike the dilemma where a cable franchiser is fighting
to gain access, in Florida Power, a landlord/tenant relationship
already existed.126 As such, the decision in Florida Power serves
to support proponents of rent-control statutes more than it favors
those advocating mandatory access. Moreover, the Supreme Court
held there that statutes regulating the economic relations of land-
lords and tenants are not per se takings, but statutes mandating the
physical occupation of an owner's property by an interloper with
a government license are such takings. 27 Correctly understood
Admiral's Cove assumes that Congress could not authorize a cable franchise to
us utility easements because such an authorization would be an unconstitution-
al taking under [Loretto]. Since most developers voluntarily grant easements
for use by utilities, however, Congress may force the developers to allow a
cable franchise to use the easement without offending the taking[s] c[fanuse of
the Constitution. See [Florida Power].
Id.
124. Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905,
910 (11th Cir. 1990). Interestingly, Senior Circuit Judge J. Smith Henley, in a concurring
opinion, stated that:
Notwithstanding theAdmiral's Cove panel's reliance on Florida Power, I do not
believe that this Supreme Court case decides the takings issue at stake in the
present case. Unlike the pole owners in Florida Power, the developer here has
never voluntarily permitted the cable company itself to occupy the property.
[I]i would require a more extensive analysis of the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence than that present here to resolve the complex issue present in this
case. Needless to say, I do not think that Admiral's Cove adequately addressed
the takings concerns in the one footnote that it devoted to this topic.
Id. at 911-12 (Henley, J., concurring).
125. Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 251-52.
126. Id. at 252.
127. Id.
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then, Florida Power stands for the limited proposition that where
a property owner voluntarily permits a cable franchisee on its prop-
erty, Congress may not regulate the rates the owner charged the
franchisee.12 1
Relying on Florida Power, proponents of mandatory access to
private easements argue that the meaning of "dedicated" demon-
strates that the Act's legislative history favors the cable franchi-
see. 29 The legislative history of the Act reveals that a property
owner who has already dedicated or is obligated to grant an ease-
ment for utilities cannot deny cable access. 30 This proposition
assumes that the word "dedicate" has a common use meaning,
which, upon a closer analysis, appears not to be the case.
Arriving at a solution to the interpretational question of what
"dedicated" means involves reviewing different opinions and deter-
mining what definition best suits the statute. Proponents of cable
rights, for example, have argued that the common dictionary defini-
tion31" should be used to define "dedicate. 132 On the other hand,
those who favor the landowner and property rights feel that a more
technical definition from a legal source such as Black's Law Dic-
tionary1 33 makes better sense.
34
128. See Media Gen. Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners,
737 F. Supp. 903, 913 (E.D. Va. 1990) (the government cannot authorize co-use of ease-
ments even when a property owner has privately allowed other occupations which are
compatible).
129. See, e.g., Centel Cable Television Co. of Fia. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs., Ltd.,
835 F.2d 1359, 1362 n.5 (11th Cir. 1988) ('The legislative history informs us that Con-
gress intended to authorize the cable operator to 'piggyback' on easements 'dedicated for
electric, gas or other utility transmission." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 8, at
59 reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4696)).
130. Id.
131. To "dedicate" is to: "Islet apart or devote formally or seriously to a definite
use, end or service." WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENG ISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 589 (1986).
132. See, e.g., Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. L White Dev. Corp., No.
88-14148, slip op. at 16-17 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir.
1990).
133. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 412 (6th ed. 1990) (Dedicated: 'To appropriate and
set apart one's private property to some public use as to make a private way public by
acts evincing an intention to do so"); cf. id. (Dedication: 'The appropriation of land, or
an easement therein, by the owner, for the use of the public and accepted for such use by
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In deciding between the two viewpoints, it helps to look at the
general congressional intent when interpreting statutory words in
the context of an art or science. Generally, when Congress uses
technical words or terms of art, these words are to be construed by
reference to the art or science involved. 35 Here, "dedicated" is
being used in the context of real property law and therefore the
construction of that word under the concepts of real property law
seems best suited for this statutory analysis. 36
Furthermore, the Congressional Record and statements of Rep-
resentatives working on the Act make it very clear that § 621(a)(2)
was not intended to provide mandatory access to private ease-
ments. 37 This background supports the proposition that the word
"dedicated" in the statute should have a more technical meaning.
Thus, while the Act can lead to two interpretations for easements
dedicated for a compatible use,' a technical definition is appropri-
ate. The issue of dedication relates to property law and, as such,
requires specificity.
Moreover, if the technical definition of "dedicated" employed
by the Third Circuit is used in interpreting the statute, it can be
looked upon as an intentional conveyance of certain rights in prop-
or on behalf of the public.").
134. See Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d
600, 606 (11th Cir.) ("Congress's use of the word 'dedicated' at least suggests a reference
to the legal meaning of 'dedication.' In general, an easement is legally 'dedicated' only
when the private property owner entirely relinquishes his rights of exclusion regarding the
easement so that the general public may use the property."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182
(1992); see also Cable Assocs., Inc. v. Town & Country Management Corp., 709 F. Supp.
582 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (court favored technical meanings over the non-legal definitions of
common words). But see St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 387, 391-
92 (N.D. Ohio 1962) ("[Wlhen a word which has both a technical and a common and
ordinary meaning appears in a statute, the latter meaning will prevail over the former in
the absence of any indication that the word was used in its technical sense.").
135. Cable Assocs., 709 F. Supp. at 584 (citing Coming Glass Works v. Brennan,
417 U.S. 188 (1974)).
136. See id.
137. See Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1989).
138. Compare Centel Cable Television Co. of Fla. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902
F.2d 905, 911 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (holding that cable company had right of access to private
utility easements in development) with Media Gen. Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium
Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 913 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding that the Act did
not create right of mandatory access to private utility easements).
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erty by the landowner to the public, as opposed to a private ease-
ment involuntarily set apart for compatible purposes. Using this
"real property" definition then, means that a landowner cannot
unknowingly grant a private easement for public use.
In the Cable Holdings decision, the Eleventh Circuit adopted
this technical definition of "dedicated."' 39 The problem in follow-
ing the Cable Holdings decision, however, is that the court distin-
guished its earlier holdings based on the fact that the developers in
those opinions "dedicated" their easements for general uitility use.140
Like the landowners in all of the cases on the issue, the Admi-
ral's Cove and White landowners did not purposely "dedicate" their
easements for cable use. Thus, if read in the context of a technical
definition of "dedicate," the lack of intent on the part of the land-
owners might render a different decision. In reality, these ease-
ments are still private. They are just being invaded by a cable
company. Accordingly, the court in Media General Cable, Inc. v.
Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners states that "no act
of a grantor manifests an intent to dedicate, nor does any act of a
cognizant public body establish an acceptance. And nothing on the
present record demonstrates that any government entity is responsi-
ble for maintaining these easements or would be accountable for
any tort liability incurred."'
14
While such a statutory interpretation supports the rights of a
landowner and the interpretation that § 621(a)(2) was not a man-
datory access statute, the legislative history of § 621(a)(2) buttress-
es the interpretation. In the original draft of the Act, there was, in
addition to § 621(a)(2), an express provision which required that a
franchisee be given access, but also explicitly provided just com-
pensation for the taking. 42 As originally drafted, the deleted § 633
gave cable franchisees mandatory access to multi-unit dwellings
139. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600,
606 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992).
140. Id. at 608.
141. 737 F. Supp. at 912.
142. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 8, at 79-81, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4716-18.
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while § 621(a)(2) provided, access over public lands.1 43
Because the statute contains a mandatory access provision, the
discussion in the Congressional Record specifically points out that
a just compensation provision must also be present to adhere to
Loretto. 144 In the subsequent deletion of the mandatory access
provision before the final draft, the just compensation provisions
were not added to § 621(a)(2). The history indicates that Congress
deleted both the mandatory access provision and the just compensa-
tion provision from the Act because they were concerned with the
constitutional strictures of Loretto.145 Failure to incorporate the just
compensation calculation provisions while incorporating the other
regulatory provisions from the same section in the draft is virtually
conclusive evidence that Congress never intended § 621(a)(2) to
permit a taking. 4
6
With the exception of the just compensation provision, the
mandatory access provision of the deleted § 633 and the final ver-
sion of § 621(a)(2) are practically identical. 47 What differs is that
while both acts have a damages provision for just compensation
caused by the "installation, construction, operation or removal of
such facilities by the cable operator,' ' 14 § 633 had two additional
143. See Media Gen. Cable, 737 F. Supp. at 911 (discussing the fact that the lan-
guage and legislative history of the Act indicated that § 621(a)(2) did not provide a right
of access to wholly private easements granted to property owners in favor of particular
utilities).
144. See H.R. REP. NO. 934, supra note 8, at 81, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4718 ("In order to comply with the constitutional requirements set forth by the court in
[Loretto], this section requires that Commission regulations, and any regulations promul-
gated by a state of franchising authority, assure that the owner of any affected premises
does receive just compensation.").
145. Id. at 79-81, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4716-18.
146. But see Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., Inc., 682 F.
Supp. 1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985) (where an argument was made that just compensation
was provided for under the act). The court, however, ruled that they could not make an
accurate interpretation of legislative intent and therefore ruled in favor of the landowner.
Id. This case, along with the district court decision in Cable Holdings, is cited in all
cases favoring cable companies as the case which decides the 'just compensation' issue
of § 621(a)(2).
147. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text.
148. See Sections 621(a)(2)(C) & 633(b)(1)(C), 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)(C) & Deleted
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provisions directly addressing just compensation for the taking.14
Thus, although the original draft of the Act allowed for just
compensation for mandatory access, the deletion of § 633 in the
final version of the Act, combined with the transfer of some of its
provisions to § 621(a)(2) (but not those provisions detailing the
factors to be considered in arriving at just compensation for a tak-
ing), is fairly conclusive evidence that § 621(a)(2) was not a man-
datory access provision. The statements of the Representatives
who worked on the Act clearly support this conclusion. 5 ' They
indicate that Congress made a considered decision that the Act
should not give cable operators the right to impose their service on
owners of multi-unit dwellings who chose not to use them.'
In short, the better alternative is to follow the Third Circuit's
reading that § 621(a)(2) is not a mandatory access statute. While
this proposition may look bleak for cable operators, that is not
necessarily true. A mandatory access provision would serve to
undermine one of the main purposes of the Act: the growth of the
cable industry. 52 Mandatory access would undermine growth be-
cause the statute would then be anti-competitive. Only "fran-
chised" cable operators would be protected by it while there are
many other services, including SMATV and non-franchised cable
operators, that can provide the same functions.
A determination that the statute does not provide mandatory
access also will not hurt the cable consumer. While some might
question whether this presents a First Amendment problem due to
a denial of access, it must be remembered that the issue here is not
whether cable service will or will not be provided, but rather, the
Section 633.
149. See H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
934, supra note 8, at 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4718. Section 633(b)(1)(D)
required that state franchising authorities or the FCC regulate just compensation determi-
nations, and § 633(2)(d) set forth factors to be considered in determining this just com-
pensation, including: (1) the extent of physical occupation; (2) the long-term damage; (3)
extent of interference with normal use and enjoyment of the property; and (4) the en-
hancement of the property's value from the availability of cable.
150. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
151. See Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1989).
152. See 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1988 & West Supp. 1992).
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question is whether or not a landowner will have the opportunity
to decide which cable system will provide it.
CONCLUSION
Section 621(a)(2) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 could not have given cable operators mandatory access to co-
easements dedicated for compatible uses without effectuating a
taking of property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The creation of an ease-
ment in gross by a landowner involves intent.153 Inherent in this
concept is the fundamental right of a property owner to choose to
exclude certain entities from his or her property. Therefore, if an
easement has not been "dedicated" for such a use by the landown-
er, to allow mandatory access without just compensation would be
an unconstitutional taking under the test laid out in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,54 which held that a perma-
nent physical invasion, no matter how small, is a taking that re-
quires just compensation.
The Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Third Circuits give
Loretto a broad interpretation. That is, they understand its holding
to apply to any involuntary permanent physical invasion, no matter
how de minimis it might be. The point on which the two circuits
differ is the meaning of "dedicated" in relation to the volun-
tary/involuntary rationale of the Act. While the Eleventh Circuit
holds that an easement dedicated once is dedicated always, the
Third Circuit considers the matter to be a property issue and em-
ploys a technical legal defimition of this term which relates to real
property and gives some control to the landowner."-, The latter
view supports a landowner's fundamental right to exclude others
153. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text (discussion of intent-based
"dedication" of an easement).
154. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
155. The Third and Eleventh Circuits have supported this definition, and it has also
been adopted by a district court in the Fourth Circuit. Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v.
McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 182
(1992); Media Gen. Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737
F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Va. 1990).
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from using his or her property. The Eleventh Circuit, on the other
hand, assumes that the dedication is voluntary (despite the fact that
later users occupied the easement without the landowner's consent),
and thus, it'avoids having to apply the involuntary takings test
found in Loretto.
In addition to statutory construction, an examination of the
statute's legislative history also supports the conclusion that the
Third Circuit is correct. Both the present statute as well as the
deleted sections serve to illustrate that a just compensation clause
was not included in the statute because it was not meant to provide
mandatory access to private easements. The fact that an earlier
version of the Act did have such a just compensation provision
further demonstrates this point. In its current form, if the Act pro-
vides for mandatory access, it would be a violation of the Takings
Clause.
The latest Eleventh Circuit decision, Cable Holdings,5 6 agreed
with the Third Circuit's interpretation of the Act and found that the
statute only provides mandatory access to public easements by
cable operators. This decision, which has caused an intra-circuit
conflict, attempts to distinguish the Eleventh Circuit's prior hold-
ings by the fact that the easements in Cable Holdings were not
dedicated. It held that because the Cable Holdings easements were
not dedicated, unlike the easements in its earlier decisions, manda-
tory access to private easements is a taking without just compensa-
tion.
In trying to avoid the takings problem, the Cable Holdings
court focused on the legislative history of the Act and ultimately
agreed with the Third Circuit in its legislative history rationale.
The case is a troublesome one, however, in that it has taken parts
of each approach and left future interpretations of the Act by the
Eleventh Circuit a daunting task. In short, Cable Holdings has
demonstrated the need for a uniform approach to the question of
mandatory access.
In light of the significant factors just highlighted, the approach
156. 953 F.2d 600.
554 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F. [Vol. 3:525
of the Third Circuit, that § 621(a)(2) is not a mandatory access
statute, is realistic. It avoids constitutional violations, adheres to
legislative history, and comports with modem property law. If the
statute is interpreted in this manner, landlords retain their funda-
mental property right to exclude, legislative history is complied
with, and cable companies are forced to compete, thereby promot-
ing the free-market system.
Marybeth W. Fahey
